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As is appropriate for an environmental law professor, I am
going to take us from the forest level down into the trees. I
want to discuss a federalism case study-the development of
policy to address the risks posed by hydraulic fracturing and
the associated shale gas boom. In fact, I'm going to focus even
more narrowly, on the private governance organizations that
work in this area, and those organizations' influence over
natural gas policy formation at the local, state, and federal
levels.
I will begin by setting the context: introducing the topic of
hydraulic fracturing and its associated risks, and briefly
outlining the federalism debate in this area. Then, I will
describe four of the private groups working on natural gas
issues, and outline some of the groups' salutary efforts to assist
local, state, and federal governments in grappling with natural
gas risks. Finally, I will conclude with a few caveats or
lessons-my preliminary thoughts about the ways that private
governance efforts like these may sometimes slow or impede
the development of sound public governance strategies, and
also the concerns raised by the "upward" percolation of new
regulatory policies from a private entity to the local, state, and
perhaps even federal level.
Hydraulic fracturing, or "fracking" as its opponents like to
call it,I makes for a fascinating federalism case study. For one
thing, the technology for extracting natural gas from shale and
other porous but non-permeable rock is developing rapidly,
generating a wide array of public health and environmental
risks that we do not yet fully understand. Moreover, the risks
vary geographically, depending on such factors as the local
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1. Jonathan Fahey, No Energy Industry Backing for the Word 'Fracking,
YAHOO! NEWS (Jan. 26, 2012), http://news.yahoo.com/no-energy-industry-backingword-fracking-222649620.html.

1124

UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 85

geology and hydrology. Public attitudes toward those risksand toward the potential benefits of oil and gas developmentalso vary widely. Finally, the local, state, and federal policy
debates are happening in real time.
Some background on the public health and environmental
risks of the gas boom is helpful to understand the local, state,
and federal policy debates. The risks involved in hydraulic
fracturing are different in kind and also broader than most
people assume. To date, the public conversation about these
risks has largely focused on the idea that by drilling down and
then fracturing rock, the industry is opening conduits for
pollutants that were formerly trapped deep underground
(including the gas itself) to leak up into our ground water. 2
Researchers and policymakers are increasingly realizing,
though, that the actual fracturing-the "frac job"-is not the
riskiest step of drilling a shale gas well. The fracturing
happens thousands of feet underground. A properly scaled
schematic makes clear that in most places, direct vertical flow
of gas and contaminants through rock fractures from the shale
layers up to drinking water aquifers is unlikely, because the
shale layers lie thousands of feet below the aquifers. 3
That said, natural gas drilling does create a potential
conduit for pollutants: the well bore. Indeed, the well is
intended to be a pathway for natural gas and other compounds
to flow to the surface. Thus, some of the risks of hydraulic
fracturing are common to any oil and gas drilling operation: the
well must be adequately sealed during drilling and production
and then permanently capped when it is no longer producing so
that it does not act as a leaky straw connecting groundwater to
underground sources of contamination. A second important set
of risks is also familiar from other oil and drilling operationsnamely, the risks associated with large-scale industrial
development, including air-pollution risks from the operation of
heavy machinery, pressures on community infrastructure from
rapid economic development, and landscape and ecosystem

2. See Hannah J. Wiseman, Risk and Response in FracturingPolicy, 84 U.
COLO. L. REV. 729, 736 (2013) ("[T]he debate has tended to focus on whether or
not the injection of water and chemicals underground-the only stage of the
process that is technically described as 'fracturing'-pollutes groundwater.").
3. Hydraulic Fracturing: The Process, FRACFOCUS, http://fracfocus.org/
hydraulic-fracturing-how-it-works/hydraulic-fracturing-process (last visited Apr.
17, 2014) (see graphic).
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disruptions from the construction of access roads and other
infrastructure. 4
Finally, hydraulic fracturing and the associated natural
gas boom are also creating less-familiar risks related to water
use and pollution. Specifically, each frac job uses millions of
gallons of water, some of which remains trapped permanently
underground. This consumptive use can increase the pressure
on already depleted aquifers and reservoirs in arid areas of the
country like Texas. 5 Further, the water that flows back out of
the well when the frac job is complete poses its own set of
problems. Contaminated with gas and other compounds from
deep underground, as well as with chemicals deliberately
introduced by the drilling companies, this water must be
handled carefully to avoid spills and must ultimately either be
treated and discharged or recycled for use in another well. In
short, hydraulic fracturing creates a broad array of
environmental and public health risks, some familiar and some
less so. 6

The breadth and nature of these risks lead some to
advocate for a federal regulatory regime as the only approach
adequate to address the impacts of drilling in downwind or
downstream states.7 In theory, existing federal environmental
statutes should address many of these "spillover" risks, but in a
classic example of a minority exercising a surprising degree of
political power in a majority-rule democracy, the oil and gas
industry has won exemptions from many of these statutes. The
Safe Drinking Water Act,8 for example, pervasively regulates
the underground injection of fluids-an activity that would
seem, on its face, to extend to hydraulic fracturing. But that
Act now includes an exemption for "the underground injection
of fluids or propping agents (other than diesel fuels) pursuant

4. See generally Wiseman, supra note 2 (detailing the risks at all stages of
tight gas development).
5. VIKRAM RAO, SHALE GAS: THE PROMISE AND THE PERIL 45-50 (2012).
6. Id. at 35-44; Wiseman, supra note 2, at 765-70 (mishandling of flowback),
788-92 (mishandling of produced water), 779-82 (improper casing), 799-801
(surface chemical and diesel fuel spills); see also Study of Hydraulic Fracturing
and Its Potential Impact on Drinking Water Resources, U.S. ENVT'L PROT.
AGENCY, http://www2.epa.gov/hfstudy (last visited Oct. 16, 2013).
7. See, e.g., Michael Burger, Response: Fracking and FederalismChoice, 161
U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 150, 162-63 (2013).
8. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f-300j (2014).
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to hydraulic fracturing operations."9 In other words, natural
gas drillers enjoy a clear and express exemption from this
important national environmental law-a fact that some
experts cite as evidence of the need for new national legislation
to address drilling risks.
Other experts, however, favor keeping the regulatory focus
at the state or local level, because the risks depend so closely
on geology, the location and abundance of drinking water
sources, and the proximity of population centers-factors that
vary widely from county to county and state to state.10
According to these policy theorists, interstate variability
necessitates that the governance regime for these risks allow
for local or state control, or at least for cooperation between
national and state government entities, and for flexible state or
local implementation of any national standards. Some local
governments are already experimenting with regulatory
approaches to minimize drilling risks. In the 2013 elections, for
example, three Colorado municipalities voted to impose a ban
or moratorium on natural gas drilling and hydraulic fracturing
within their city limits.1 1 To date, over one hundred United
States cities have similarly experimented with a ban or
moratorium of some form. 12 Hydraulic fracturing thus affords
an opportunity to watch the workings of what Heather Gerken
has called "federalism all the way down."1 3

9. Id. § 300h(d)(1).
10. See, e.g., David B. Spence, Federalism,Regulatory Lags, and the Political
Economy of Energy Production, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 431, 492-93, 508 (2013).
11. Michael Wines, Colorado Cities' Rejection of Fracking Poses Political Test
for Natural Gas Industry, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 7, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/
2013/1 1/08/us/colorado-cities-rejection-of-fracking-poses-political-test-for-naturalgas-industry.html?smid=pl-share. The industry may well challenge those bans as
preempted by state law. Precedent in Colorado establishes that
while the [state's] Oil and Gas Conservation Act does not totally preempt
a home-rule city's exercise of land-use authority over oil and gas
development and operations within the territorial limits of the city, the
statewide interest in the efficient development and production of oil and
gas resources .

.

. prevents a home-rule city from exercising its land-use

authority so as to totally ban the drilling of oil, gas, or hydrocarbon wells
within the city.
Voss v. Lundvall Bros., Inc., 830 P.2d 1061, 1062 (Colo. 1992).
12. Wines, supra note 11.
13. Heather Gerken, Forward: Federalism All the Way Down, 124 HARV. L.
REV. 4, 10 (2010) ("The nationalist account offered here ... is an account in which
localities serve as staging grounds for national debates, and the decisions of the
variegated periphery feed back into national policymaking").
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Indeed, the dialog over development of natural gas policy
extends "down" not just to local government entities, but also to
numerous private-governance
organizations,
which are
stepping in to fill the gaps in existing federal and state drilling
laws. These organizations are playing all of the roles that one
might expect government actors to play. Consider, for example,
the problem of information gathering. One reason we do not
currently understand the risks of this technology is that it is
quite difficult to ascertain precisely what the companies are
doing-where they are drilling, how deep, in what directions,
and what chemicals they are adding to the water for the frac
job. There has been considerable public outcry about this last
issue. 14 We know the companies use a lot of water at high
pressure, and that they add compounds to make the water less
viscous, to prevent bacteria from growing down in the fracture,
and for various other purposes. However, we do not know
precisely which chemicals are used or in what amounts, and
companies have been quick to claim that these details are
confidential business information.1 5
Private governance organizations have stepped up in this
area. For example, the industry has developed a private entity,
FracFocus, 16 that provides a web platform for companies to
disclose information voluntarily about their drilling practices.
According to an industry watcher, as of October 2013, twelve
states had adopted the website as the platform for their own
voluntary (or, in some cases, mandatory) hydraulic fracturing
disclosure rules, and seven other states were in the process of
doing Sol 7-evidence that private governance efforts can exert

14. See, e.g., Mike Soraghan, Hydraulic Fracturing: Two-Thirds of Frack
Disclosures Omit 'Secrets', ENERGYWIRE (Sept. 26, 2012), http://www.eenews.
net/stories/1059970474 ("'It's outrageous that citizens are not getting all the
information they need about fracking near their homes,' said Amy Mall, who
tracks drilling issues for the Natural Resources Defense Council. 'Companies
should not be able to keep secrets about potentially dangerous chemicals they're
bringing into communities and injecting into the ground near drinking water."').
15. See, e.g., id. ("Two out of every three times oil and gas companies have
publicly disclosed the chemicals in their hydraulic fracturing fluid, they've left
something out. At least one chemical was kept secret in 65 percent of fracking
disclosures by companies that said they needed to protect confidential business
information, according to a review of [a fracking database].").
16. FRACFOCUS, http://fracfocus.org/ (last visited Apr. 17, 2014).
17. Edith Allison, Self Compliance Joins 'Best-Practices' List, AAPG
http://www.aapg.org/explorer/2013/10oct/
EXPLORER 46, 46 (Oct. 2013),
10explorerl3.pdf.
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a strong influence over the development of public policy.
However, the influence of private governance entities is
not limited to information gathering. For example, several
private groups are working to develop standards or best

practices for hydraulic fracturing. The Center for Sustainable
Shale Development (CSSD),1 8 is a collaborative entity with
both industry and environmental representatives. CSSD has
developed fifteen "initial performance standards for [natural
gas well] operators that are protective of air quality, water
resources and climate,"1 9 but the group is too new to measure
the success of these standards. A second, industry-led entity,
the American Petroleum Institute (API), also has developed
best practices for hydraulic fracturing. 20 Like CSSD, API has
not yet studied the success of its relatively new hydraulic
fracturing standards, but the group's broader oil and gas
standards fare quite well in statehouses and federal agencies:
some two hundred of API's oil and gas standards have been
cited over 3,300 times in state regulations, and one hundred of
those standards have been cited over 270 times in federal
regulations. 2 1 In other words, there is clear evidence that the
private, API-authored standards are percolating up and
influencing the shape of state and federal oil and gas
regulations.
Finally, from a federalism perspective, the most
interesting private governance group in this area is an entity
called STRONGER-State Review of Oil and Natural Gas
Environmental Regulations. 22 STRONGER describes itself as a
collaborative review team of stakeholders from industry, the
environmental community, and state environmental regulatory

18. CTR. FOR SUSTAINABLE SHALE DEV. (CSSD), http://www.sustainableshale.
org/ (last visited Mar. 6, 2014).
19. Performance Standards, CTR. FOR SUSTAINABLE SHALE DEV., https://www.
sustainableshale.org/performance-standards/ (last visited Mar. 6, 2014).
20. Overview of Industry Guidance/Best Practices on Hydraulic
Fracturing,AM. PETROLEUM INST. (2012), http://www.api.org/~/media/Files/Policy/
Exploration/Hydraulic FracturingInfoSheet.pdf.
21. See Overview of Industry: Guidance/Best Practices Supporting
Hydraulic Fracturing, AM. PETROLEUM INST. (2013), http://www.api.org/~/
media/Files/Policy/HydraulicFracturing/Hydraulic-Fracturing-Best-Practices.pdf.
Cf. NATHAN RICHARDSON ET AL., THE STATE OF STATE SHALE GAS REGULATION,
RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE 7 (June 2013), http://www.rff.org/RFF/
Documents/RFF-Rpt-StateofStateRegsReport.pdf (noting the authors' use of API
standards as a benchmark).
22. STRONGER, http://www.strongerinc.org/ (last visited Mar. 6, 2014).
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programs. 2 3 The team actively reviews state efforts to
implement best practices for oil and gas drilling and issues
state report cards and works with states to improve their
regulatory regimes. 24 As with API, STRONGER has not yet
assessed its efficacy with respect to hydraulic fracturing
practices per se, but overall the group has conducted surveys
and follow-up studies and claims that close to 75 percent of the
recommendations in its state report cards have led to
improvement in state regulation. 2 5
As the examples of FracFocus, API, CSSD, and
STRONGER illustrate, private governance entities can play
important roles in catalyzing experimentation with new policy
approaches. Specifically, these entities can develop a menu of
policy options for states to sample, assist with data gathering,
and help states in implementing suitable policies.
To explore just one of these functions in a little more
depth, it is interesting to consider the role that a group like
STRONGER can play in diffusing information about different
states' successes and failures with experimental policy
approaches. A little-explored weakness in the states-aslaboratories model of federalism 26 is the difficulty that other
states may encounter in attempting to ascertain the precise
contours of a particular state's experiment. Put differently,
even when states are experimenting with new policies, as is
happening in the natural gas area, it can be very hard for
regulators in one state to get information about what other
states are actually doing on the ground-for example, what the
other states' drilling permits require and how stringently those
permits are being enforced. 2 7 A group like STRONGER, which
does the legwork of surveying state policies and polling state
regulators, can serve an important role in gathering this
information and diffusing it from state to state, so that if there
is a successful experiment in state A, other states can learn
from state A's experience.
23. Id.
24. The Process, STRONGER, http://www.strongerinc.org/process (last visited
Mar. 6, 2014).
25. Id.
26. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) ("It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single
courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel
social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.").
27. See RICHARDSON ET AL., supra note 21, at 2-3, 6.
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Importantly though, private governance entities' effects on
policy development may not be entirely salutary. I want to
identify a few concerns that these groups should raise for
anyone interested in the sound functioning of our federal
system. First, to the extent that these groups are offering a
suite of potential best practices for individual businesses to
choose from, they may contribute to state policy
experimentation, because state regulators can wait to see
which voluntary practices work under the particular conditions
of a given state and then adopt those practices as state
requirements. But to the extent that private governance groups
are instead handing states a prix fixe menu of standardized
options, the groups may instead be operating to reduce state
experimentation and, in turn, to limit any individual state's
ability to tailor policy to local conditions.
Let me take one concrete example: FracFocus. As noted
above, numerous states have adopted FracFocus's information
platform for disclosures about well sites. Unfortunately,
however, FracFocus's disclosure platform is not always
perfectly tailored to match a state's disclosure requirements.
Indeed, one author concludes that the "[ulse of FracFocus ...
appears to reduce compliance with some state reporting
requirements," because the website "contains [data] fields for
only a very limited subset of the information that state
disclosure rules [purport to] require." 28 Another author notes
that FracFocus does not solicit such information as the
distance from the well to surrounding surface water bodies. 29
When a state adopts FracFocus as its information disclosure
platform, therefore, the opportunity to gather that important
and local variable information is lost.
The work of groups like FracFocus, CSSD, API, and

28. MATTHEW MCFEELEY, STATE HYDRAULIC FRACTURING DISCLOSURE
RULES AND ENFORCEMENT: A COMPARISON, NRDC Issue Brief
8 (July

2012),

http://www.nrdc.org/energy/files/Fracking-Disclosure-IB.pdf

(emphasis

added); see also KATE KONSCHNIK ET AL., LEGAL FRACTURES IN CHEMICAL
DISCLOSURE LAWS: WHY THE VOLUNTARY CHEMICAL DISCLOSURE REGISTRY
FRACFOCUS FAILS AS A REGULATORY COMPLIANCE TOOL, HARV. L. SCH. ENVTL. L.

PROGRAM POL'Y INITIATIVE 1-2 (Apr. 23, 2013), http://blogs.law.harvard.edul
environmentallawprogram/files/2013/04/4-23-2013-LEGAL-FRACTURES.pdf.
29. Hannah J. Wiseman, The Private Role in Public FracturingDisclosure
and Regulation, 3 HARV. BUS. L. REV. ONLINE 49, 63, 66 (Feb. 8, 2013),
http://www.hblr.org/2013/02/the-private-role-in-public-fracturing-disclosure-andregulation/.
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STRONGER may therefore be slowing or even impeding state
experimentation-simplifying the work of state regulators, but
in so doing, discouraging states from trying new and different
approaches to mitigating risks. That is not a worrying trend if
the one-size-fits-all products offered by the groups are sound,
but it is quite worrying if there is any reason to be concerned
about those products.
That leads me to my last point, which is that we ought to
recognize these private governance entities' bottom-up
influence on the development of state and federal regulatory
approaches, and demand that the groups learn the lessons of
administrative
law
with
respect
to
transparency,
accountability, and efficacy. Much of administrative law aims
to increase public participation in agency policy development,
to provide for fair adjudicatory procedures in case of
enforcement disputes, and to ensure outside oversight of all
agency activities. The examples of FracFocus, CSSD, API, and
STRONGER suggest, though, that much of the lowest-level
policy development is happening not in statehouses or agencies
but in private entities. If that is the case, then it is incumbent
on those entities to follow procedures similar to those used by
government agencies: to put draft standards out for public
comment; to receive comments from a wide variety of
audiences; to consider and respond to those comments; and to
implement sound adjudicatory procedures to resolve disputes
over policy implementation and enforcement. One might even
argue that the very integrity of our federal system hinges on
such reforms.

